Programming in logic without logic programming by KOWALSKI, R & SADRI, F
Programming in Logic Without Logic Programming 
Robert Kowalski and Fariba Sadri 
 
Department of Computing   
Imperial College London 
{rak,fs@doc.ic.ac.uk} 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract 
In previous work, we proposed a logic-based framework in which computation is the execu-
tion of actions in an attempt to make reactive rules of the form if antecedent then consequent 
true in a canonical model of a logic program determined by an initial state, sequence of 
events, and the resulting sequence of subsequent states. In this model-theoretic semantics, 
reactive rules are the driving force, and logic programs play only a supporting role. 
 In the canonical model, states, actions and other events are represented with timestamps. 
But in the operational semantics, for the sake of efficiency, timestamps are omitted and only 
the current state is maintained. State transitions are performed reactively by executing actions 
to make the consequents of rules true whenever the antecedents become true. This operational 
semantics is sound, but incomplete. It cannot make reactive rules true by preventing their 
antecedents from becoming true, or by proactively making their consequents true before their 
antecedents become true. 
 In this paper, we characterize the notion of reactive model, and prove that the operational 
semantics can generate all and only such models. In order to focus on the main issues, we 
omit the logic programming component of the framework. 
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1 Introduction 
 
State transition systems play an important role in many areas of Computing. They    
underpin the operational semantics of imperative programming languages, the dy-
namic behavior of database management systems, and many aspects of knowledge 
representation in artificial intelligence. In many of these systems, state transitions 
are performed by executing reactive rules of the form if antecedent then consequent, 
which describe relationships between earlier and later states and events. Such reac-
tive rules occur explicitly as condition-action rules in production systems, event-
condition-action rules in active databases, and transition rules in Abstract State Ma-
chines (Gurevich 2000). They are implicit in Statecharts (Harel 1987) and BDI 
agents plans (Rao and Georgeff 1995). They are the core of Reaction RuleML 
(Paschke et al. 2012).  
 Despite the apparently logical syntax of reactive rules in these systems, hardly 
any of these systems give if-then rules a logical interpretation. In this paper, we 
investigate the semantics of a logical language, KELPS, in which programs are sets 
of reactive rules of the form X [antecedent Y [consequent]] in classical, first-
order logic (FOL), and computation is understood as generating a sequence of state 
transitions with the purpose of making the reactive rules true.  
  KELPS (Kowalski and Sadri 2012) is the reactive Kernel of LPS (Kowalski and 
Sadri 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015), a Logic-based agent and Production 
System language, which combines reactive rules and logic programs. KELPS is 
obtained from LPS by dropping the logic programming component of LPS. It is in 
this sense that KELPS is a language for programming in logic without logic pro-
gramming. 
  The operational semantics (OS) of KELPS is similar to that of imperative reac-
tive rule languages, which maintain only a single current state, using destructive 
state transitions. However the model-theoretic semantics of KELPS combines all the 
states into a single model, by associating time stamps with facts, actions and exter-
nal events. 
 In (Kowalski and Sadri 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015), we showed that the OS of LPS 
(and therefore of KELPS) is sound: Any sequence of states and events that the OS 
recognizes as solving the computational task generates a model that makes the reac-
tive rules true. In this paper, we investigate the completeness of the OS of KELPS, 
and show that the OS can generate all reactive models, in which the consequents of 
reactive rules are made true after their antecedents become true. However, the OS of 
KELPS (and therefore of LPS) is incomplete, because it can generate only reactive 
models. 
 The OS of KELPS cannot generate models that proactively make consequents 
true whether or not their antecedents become true; that preventively make anteced-
ents false to avoid making their consequents true; or that make their antecedents 
true, and are then forced to make their consequents true. Moreover, it does not gen-
erate models that contain actions that are irrelevant to the computational task. 
 Because the OS of KELPS is similar to that of imperative reactive rule languages, 
the incompleteness of the KELPS OS shows that the operational semantics of con-
ventional reactive system languages are also incomplete, if their reactive rules are 
read as logical implications. 
 LPS (and therefore KELPS) is a scaled-down and optimised version of abductive 
logic programming (ALP) (Kakas et al. 1998).  There exist proof procedures for 
ALP that can generate proactive and preventative models, but avoid generating ob-
viously irrelevant actions. In section 6.2, we discuss the relationship between 
KELPS/LPS and ALP. 
 Fig. 1 illustrates KELPS and some of the different kinds of models that are al-
lowed by the model-theoretic semantics of KELPs. There is a single reactive rule 
stating that if you see a wolf at time T then you cry wolf at time T+1. An external 
event, see-wolf, occurs at time 3. The reactive model includes all and only the exter-
nal events and the actions (here, the single action cry-wolf at time 4) that are moti-
vated by the reactive rule and triggered by the external events. 
 
Reactive rule:       T [see-wolf(T)   cry-wolf(T+1)] 
External event:        see-wolf(3) 
Reactive model:       see-wolf(3), cry-wolf(4) 
Proactive model:        cry-wolf(1), cry-wolf(2), see-wolf(3), cry-wolf(4) 
Model with irrelevant action:    see-wolf(3), cry-wolf(4), drink(4) 
Fig. 1.  Example Models of Reactive Rules in KELPS. 
 
The example in Fig. 2 is a variant of that in Fig. 1. The reactive rule in Fig. 2 states 
that you cry wolf if you see a wolf and you are outside. The state records whether or 
not the agent is outside. The causal theory updates the state as a result of both exter-
nal events and actions. The agent is initially outdoors. Both models in Fig. 2 include 
all the timestamped facts belonging to any state, all the timestamped external events, 
and all the timestamped actions motivated by the reactive rule. The non-reactive, 
preventative model includes an action of going inside, which prevents the need for 
crying wolf. Of course, another non-reactive model can include both actions. 
 
Reactive rule:     T [see-wolf(T)  outdoors(T)  cry-wolf(T+1)]      
Causal Theory:    terminates(go-inside, outdoors) 
         initiates(go-outside, outdoors) 
Initial state S0 at time 0:  outdoors 
External event:      see-wolf(3) 
Reactive model:     outdoors(0), outdoors(1), outdoors(2), outdoors(3), ….,  
          see-wolf(3), cry-wolf(4) 
Preventative model:   outdoors(0), outdoors(1), go-inside(1), see-wolf(3) 
Fig. 2.  Example Models of Reactive Rules in KELPS. 
 
In this paper, we characterize the reactive models I generated by the KELPS OS. 
These models all have the property that every action in I is motivated by being an 
instance of an action that occurs explicitly in the consequent of a rule whose earlier 
conditions (in the antecedent or consequent of the rule) are already true.  
 In the remainder of the paper, we present KELPS, its model-theoretic and opera-
tional semantics, the relationship between the two semantics, the relationship with 
related work, and future work.  
 This paper extends an earlier paper (Kowalski and Sadri 2014) by including 
proofs of all the theorems (in the Appendix), extending KELPS to allow more gen-
eral FOL conditions, simplifying many of the definitions, and including an extensive 
comparison with related approaches. 
 
2  KELPS 
 
The example in Fig. 3 illustrates additional features of the language. In this example, 
the consequent of the rule consists of two alternative plans with deadlines: When an 
order is received from a reliable customer, then the item needs to be dispatched, and 
an invoice needs to be sent within 3 time units of receiving the order. Alternatively, 
an apology needs to be sent within 5 time units. Temporal constraints are defined by 
an auxiliary theory, which is not presented here. They are solved by means of a con-
straint solver, as in constraint logic programming (Jaffar and Lassez 1987). 
 Actions in KELPS can be executed concurrently. Consistency is maintained by 
monitoring the preconditions of sets of events. In this example, a precondition en-
sures that the same item is not dispatched to two different customers at the same 
time. We will see later that preconditions can also be used to prevent sending an 
apology if the item has already been dispatched.  
 The semantics of KELPS is non-deterministic: It does not matter which alterna-
tive plan is chosen. However in practice, some alternatives are better than others. 
For example, it may be a good strategy to try first a plan with the earliest deadline, 
and to try later an alternative plan with a later deadline if the earlier plan has failed. 
Any actions performed in the earlier, partially executed plan are committed choices, 
which cannot be undone by rolling back time. At best, their effects can be undone 
only by performing compensating actions later in time. 
 In a practical implementation, for most applications, it would be desirable to pro-
vide a method to control the choice of alternatives. However, for lack of space, we 
do not address such control issues in this paper. 
  
Reactive rule:  C, Item, T1 [orders(C, Item, T1)  reliable(C, T1) 
         T2, T3 [dispatch(C, Item, T2)  send-invoice(C, Item, T3)  
         T1 < T2   T3    T1 + 3]  
          [send-apology(C, Item, T4)  T1 < T4    T1 + 5]]] 
Causal theory:  initiates(send-invoice(C, Item), payment-due( C, Item))                   
      terminates(pays-invoice(C, Item), payment-due( C, Item)) 
      dispatch(C1, Item, T) dispatch(C2, Item, T)  C1  C2 false 
Initial state:    reliable(bob)   
Fig. 3.  An Example with a Complex Consequent. 
 
The operational semantics of KELPS maintains a single current state Si at time i. It 
reasons with the reactive rules, to generate a set of actions actsi+1, which it combines 
with a set of external events exti+1, to produce a consistent set of concurrent events 
evi+1 =  exti+1  actsi+1. The events evi+1 are used to update the current state Si, gen-
erating the successor state Si+1 = succ(Si, evi+1) by deleting facts that are terminated 
by the events evi+1 and adding facts that are initiated by evi+1. 
  In KELPS, states are represented by sets of atomic sentences (also called ground 
atoms, facts or fluents). Events are also represented by atomic sentences. Such sets 
of atomic sentences can be understood either syntactically as theories or sematically 
as model-theoretic structures. It is this second, model-theoretic interpretation that 
underpins the logical semantics of KELPS.  
 States and events can be represented with or without timestamps. The representa-
tion without timestamps (e.g. outdoors, reliable(bob)) facilitates destructive updates, 
because if a fact is not terminated by a set of events then the fact without timestamps 
simply persists from one state to the next. However, the representation with time-
stamps (e.g. outdoors(0), reliable(bob, 0)) makes it possible to combine all states 
and events into a single model-theoretic structure.  
  
2.1  Vocabulary 
 
KELPS is a first-order, sorted language, including a sort for time. In the version of 
KELPS presented in this paper, we assume that time is linear and discrete, and that 
the succession of timepoints is represented by the ticks of a logical clock, where 1, 
2, ... stand for s(0), s(s(0)), …., t+1 stands for s(t) and t+n stands for sn(t). Thus Si 
represents the state at time i, and evi+1 represents the set of events taking place in the 
transition from state Si to Si+1. Other representations of time are also possible. 
 
Predicates: The predicate symbols of the language are partitioned into sets repre-
senting fluents, events, auxiliary predicates and meta-predicates: 
Fluent predicates represent facts in the states Si. The last argument i of a 
timestamped fluent atom p(t1, …, tn, i) is a time parameter, representing the time i ≥ 
0 of the state Si  to which the fluent belongs. The unstamped fluent atom p(t1, …, tn) 
is the same atom without this timestamp.  
Event predicates represent events contributing to the transition from one state to 
the next. The last argument of a timestamped event atom e(t1, …, tn, i) is a time pa-
rameter, representing the time i ≥ 1  of the successor state Si. The unstamped event 
atom e(t1, …, tn) is the same atom without this time parameter. Event predicates are 
partitioned into external event predicates and action predicates.  
Fluent and event predicates can have time parameters, called reference times, that 
are not timestamps. For example in deadline(Task, D, T), the time parameter D is a 
reference time, which expresses that at time T the deadline for Task is D. 
Auxiliary predicates are of two kinds: Time-independent predicates, for example 
isa(book, item), do not include time parameters. Temporal constraint predicates, 
including inequalities of the form T1 < T2 and T1  T2 between timepoints,          
and functional relationships among timepoints, such as max(T1, T2, T) and            
min(T1, T2, T) have only time parameters.  
In KELPS, temporal constraints constrain the timestamps of fluents and events. 
As a consequence, every temporal constraint in a reactive rule contains at least one 
time parameter that occurs as a timestamp in a fluent or event atom of the rule.  
In LPS, auxiliary predicates are defined by logic programs. In KELPS, they are 
defined more simply by a (possibly infinite) set Aux of atomic sentences. In the case 
of auxiliary temporal constraint predicates, this assumption is equivalent to the as-
sumption made in the semantics of constraint logic programming (CLP). The 
KELPS OS exploits this relationship with CLP by using a constraint solver to sim-
plify temporal constraints and to check them for satisfiability.  
The meta-predicates consist of the two predicates initiates(events, fluent) and 
terminates(events, fluent), which specify the post-conditions of events and perform 
state transitions, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The first argument is a set of events, to cater 
for the case where two events together have different effects from the individual 
events on their own (as when you buy two books and get the cheaper one for half 
price; or when two people push a heavy object that cannot be moved by one person 
alone). The second argument is a fluent without timestamps.  In LPS, these meta-
predicates are defined by logic programs. In KELPS, they are defined by atomic 
sentences
1
 in a causal theory C, which also contains constraints on the preconditions 
and co-occurrence of events.
2
  
 
Notation: If Si is a set of fluents without timestamps, representing a single state, 
then Si* represents the same set of fluents with the same timestamp i. If eventsi is a 
set of events without timestamps, all taking place in the transition from state Si-1 to 
state Si, then eventsi* represents the same set of events with the same timestamp i.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 In the examples, in Fig. 3 and elsewhere in the paper, we use variables in the definitions of 
auxiliary predicates as a shorthand for the set of all the well-sorted ground instances of the 
definitions. 
2 In some earlier papers, this causal theory was called a “domain theory”.   
2.2  KELPS Framework 
 
Definition. A KELPS framework (or program) is a triple <R, Aux, C>, where R is a 
set of reactive rules, Aux is a set of ground atoms defining auxiliary predicates, and 
C is a causal theory.  
 
Rules in R are constructed from formulas that represent complex patterns of states 
and events, expressed as conjunctions of FOL conditions and temporal constraints. 
Operationally, an FOL condition is a query to Aux  Si*  evi*, which is the 
timestamped state at time i, augmented with the most recent set of events and the 
definition of the time-independent auxiliary predicates. For example, the FOL condi-
tion: 
 
  Item D [manages(M, D, T)  item(Item, D)   instock(Item, T)]  
 
behaves as a query that returns managers M all of whose departments D have all of 
their items Item in stock at time T. The variables Item and D are said to be bound in 
the condition, and the variables M and T are unbound in the condition. We will see 
later that, depending where the condition occurs in a reactive rule, the variables M 
and T will be either universally or existential quantified in the rule. 
 
Definition. An FOL condition is an FOL formula containing exactly one timestamp, 
which is either a constant or a variable, whose atoms are either fluent atoms, event 
atoms or time-independent auxiliary predicates. If the timestamp is a variable, then it 
is not bound by any quantifier in the FOL condition. 
 
Definition. A complex pattern of states and events (complex for short) is a possibly 
empty conjunction of FOL conditions and temporal constraints. All time variables in 
temporal constraints in the complex occur as time parameters in FOL conditions of 
the complex or are functionally dependent on such time parameters.   
 
For example, T3 is functionally dependent on T1 and T2 in max(T1, T2, T3), and T2 
is functionally dependent on T1 in  plus(T1, 3, T2).   
 
Definition. A reactive rule (or simply rule) is a sentence of the form: 
 X [antecedent Y [consequent]] where: 
 X is the set of all variables, including time variables, occurring in antecedent 
 and not bound in FOL conditions. Y is the set of all variables, including time 
 variables, occurring only in consequent and not bound in FOL conditions. 
  consequent is a disjunction consequent1  ... consequentn. 
 antecedent and each antecedent  consequenti  is a complex.  
  For every substitution  that replaces the time variables in X and Y by ground 
times and such that the temporal constraints in antecedent  and  consequent  
are true in Aux, all timestamps in FOL conditions in consequent  are later than 
or equal to all timestamps in FOL conditions in antecedent . 
  Every temporal constraint in consequenti  contains at least one timestamp vari-
able that occurs in an FOL condition in consequenti  or is functionally dependent 
on such timestamp variables.  
 Intuitively, the next-to-last bullet restricts reactive rules to ones whose antecedent is 
a conjunction of FOL conditions about the past or present and whose consequent is a 
disjunction of conjunctions of FOL conditions about the present or future. The last 
bullet prevents such rules as p(T1) q(T2) T1<10  T1<T2, with a constraint 
T1<10 in the consequent that only constrains a timestamp in the antecedent. 
 Because of the restrictions on quantifiers, and because of the logical equivalence 
Y [p  q]  Y p  Z q, we can omit the quantifiers X and Y, and simply write 
antecedent   consequent  or antecedent   consequent1 ... consequentn. 
 Variables that are unbound in an FOL condition become bound either universally 
or existentially, depending on where the condition occurs in a rule. For example, if 
the condition Item D [manages(M, D, T)  item(Item, D)   instock(Item, T)] 
occurs in the antecedent of a rule, then M and T are bound by the universal quantifi-
ers of the rule. If the condition occurs in the consequent of a rule, and M and T do 
not occur in the antecedent of the rule, then M and T are bound by the existential 
quantifiers of the consequent of the rule. To avoid ambiguity, if an FOL condition is 
the consequent of a rule with an empty antecedent, then we write the rule in the form 
true  consequent. 
  Note that, in the operational semantics, all the components of an FOL condition 
are evaluated together in Aux  Si*  evi*. Several such FOL conditions can be 
evaluated at the same time i, if their timestamps can all be unified to time i. Note 
also that, if antecedent is empty, then antecedent is equivalent to true.  If consequent 
is empty, then consequent is equivalent to false. 
 An FOL condition that contains an action atom can be evaluated in Aux  Si*  
evi*, like any other FOL condition. However, an action atom  act that is a conjunct 
of an FOL condition of the form
3
 conjunct1  act   conjunct2 in the consequent of 
a rule can also be selected as a candidate for execution in the transition to the next 
state Si+1. Such action atoms are called bare action atoms. 
 
Definition. Let consequenti  of a rule be of the form conjunct1  act   conjunct2 
where act is an action atom, then act is a bare action atom in consequenti. 
 
State transitions are performed by means of a causal theory, which imposes precon-
ditions on sets of events and defines the postconditions of sets of events. 
 
Definition. A causal theory, C = Cpost  Cpre, consists of two parts: Cpost is a set of 
atomic sentences defining the predicates initiates and terminates. Cpre is a set of 
sentences of the form current(T-1)  events(T) false, where current(T-1)  is a 
(possibly empty) FOL condition with timestamp T-1, events(T) is a non-empty FOL 
condition with timestamp T containing no fluents, and all variables not explicitly 
bound in FOL conditions are implicitly universally quantified.   
 
                                                          
3
 For simplicity we say that a formula has a particular form when we mean that the formula 
can be rewritten into that form simply by reordering conjunctions and disjunctions, taking 
commutativity and associativity into account.  
 
The syntax of Cpre allows the specification of such typical preconditions for the exe-
cution of a single action as: 
 
   ¬ in-stock(Item, T-1)  dispatch(C, Item, T)  false 
 
where in-stock(Item) is a fluent, initiated and terminated by such actions as 
stock(Item) and dispatch(C, Item), respectively. The syntax of Cpre also allows the 
prohibition of such concurrent sets of events as: 
 
   dispatch(C1, Item, T)  dispatch(C2, Item, T)  C1  C2  false 
 
It is also possible to specify that certain actions must co-occur: 
 
   leave-house(T)  ¬ take-keys (T)  false. 
 
In the example of Fig. 3, sending an apology if an item has already been dispatched 
or is being dispatched can be prevented by means of the preconditions: 
 
   dispatched(C, Item, T)  send-apology(C, Item, T)  false 
   dispatch(C, Item, T)]  send-apology(C, Item, T)  false 
where dispatched(C, Item) is a fluent initiated by the action dispatch(C, Item). 
 The use of atomic sentences to define the predicates initiates and terminates is 
similar to the use of add-lists and delete-lists in STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson 1972). 
However, it is more general, because the first argument of both predicates is a set of 
events. Defining the fluents initiated and terminated by sets of concurrent events 
explicitly by means of atomic sentences is not very practical, but it clarifies the 
model-theoretic semantics and simplifies the operational semantics. Moreover, it 
paves the way for the more practical representation in which initiates and terminates 
are defined by logic programs in LPS.  
 
3 The KELPS Model-theoretic Semantics 
 
In the model-theoretic semantics of KELPS, the truth values of the rules R and the 
preconditions Cpre are defined according to the standard, non-modal semantics of 
classical first-order logic. This contrasts with the semantics of modal logics, in 
which states are represented by possible worlds, linked by accessibility relations.  
 In the operational semantics of KELPS, states are updated by adding and deleting 
fluents. Fluents that are not affected by the update are left untouched: 
 
Definition. If <R, Aux, C> is a KELPS framework, S is a set of unstamped fluents, 
representing a single state, and ev is a set of unstamped events, representing concur-
rent events, then the associated successor state is: 
 
 succ(S, ev) = (S  – {p | terminates(ev, p)  Cpost })  {p | initiates(ev, p)  Cpost}. 
 
In the model-theoretic semantics, fluents and events are all timestamped, so they can 
be included in a single model-theoretic structure M = Aux   S*   ev*: 
 Notation. If S0 is an initial state, ext1,  … ,  exti, …, is a sequence of sets of external 
events and acts1,  … ,  actsi, … is a sequence of sets of actions, then:   
 
S*  =  S0*     …    Si*     … where Si+1 = succ(Si, evi+1) 
ev*  =  ev0*    …   evi*   … where ev0 = {} and evi   = exti   actsi, for  i 1. 
 
Computation in a conventional reactive system consists in generating a stream 
act1,…, acti,… of actions in response to a stream ev1,… evi,….  of external events 
and previously generated actions. Computation in KELPS is similar, but it has a 
purpose, namely to make the reactive rules and the preconditions of actions true: 
   
Definition. Given a KELPS framework <R, Aux, C> and initial state S0, the compu-
tational task is, for every  i ≥ 0, and for every sequence ev0 … evi of sets of external 
events and previously generated actions, to generate a set actsi+1 of actions such that 
R  Cpre is true in the Herbrand interpretation M = Aux   S*   ev*.  
 
The definition of truth for reactive rules is the classic definition for sentences of 
FOL. As a consequence, the computational task allows the generation of actions that 
make the rules true by making their antecedents false, or by making their conse-
quents true whether their antecedents are true or false. It also allows the perfor-
mance of actions that are irrelevant to the task. These kinds of “preventative”, “pro-
active” or “irrelevant” actions cannot be generated by conventional reactive systems. 
Nor can they be generated by KELPS.  In this paper, we identify the kind of reactive 
models that are generated by the KELPS operational semantics.  
 Note that in KELPS the generated actions actsi+1 need not be a direct reaction to 
the current situation Si*  evi*. They can be a partial response to earlier situations.  
 
3.1 Herbrand interpretations 
 
The semantics of Herbrand interpretations is a simplified version of the standard 
semantics of first-order logic.  
 
Definition. Given a sorted first-order language, the Herbrand universe U is the set 
of all well-sorted ground (i.e variable-free) terms that can be constructed from the 
non-empty set of constants and function symbols of the vocabulary. The Herbrand 
base is the set of all well-sorted ground atoms that can be constructed from the 
predicate symbols and the ground terms of the vocabulary. A Herbrand interpreta-
tion is a subset of the Herbrand base. A Herbrand model M of a set S of sentences is 
a Herbrand interpretation such that every sentence in S is true in M. 
 
One difference from the standard definition of truth is the base case: If I is a 
Herbrand interpretation, then a ground atom A is true in I if and only if A  I. The 
other difference is the definition of truth for universally and existentially quantified 
sentences: A sentence of the form X s(X) is true if and only if for all t  U, where t 
has the same sort as X, the sentence s(t) is true. Similarly, X s(X) is true if and only 
if for some t  U, where t has the same sort as X, the sentence s(t) is true. For this to 
be sensible, the Herbrand universe U needs to be non-empty, as in the standard defi-
nition of truth. 
 Thus, a ruleX [antecedent Y [consequent1  ... consequentn]] is true in I if 
and only if, for every ground instance antecedent   that is true in I, there exists a 
ground instance consequenti    that is also true in I. Here the substitutions   and   
replace the variables X and Y, respectively, by terms of the appropriate sort in the 
Herbrand universe U.  For simplicity, we assume that, except for time parameters, 
all fluents have the same ground instances over U in all states. 
 
3.2 The temporal structure of KELPS interpretations 
 
The timestamping of fluents and events, and the restrictions on the syntax of KELPS 
provide Herbrand interpretations of KELPS programs with a rich structure of sub-
interpretations. This structure is captured by the following theorem, which is an 
immediate consequence of the definition of truth.  
 
Theorem 1. Given a KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state S0, and sequence 
of sets of events ev0 … evi: 
1. If s is a conjunction of temporal constraints whose time parameters are all 
 ground, then s is true in Aux  S*  ev* if and only if s is true in Aux. 
2. If s is a conjunction of FOL conditions and temporal constraints whose time  
 parameters are all ground, then: 
 a.  If all the timestamps in s are the same time i,  
  then s is true in Aux  S*  ev* if and only if s is true in Aux    Si*  evi*. 
 b.  If i is the latest timestamp in s, then s is true in Aux    S*   ev*  
  if and only if s is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si*   ev0*  ...  evi*. 
 
There is an obvious similarity with the possible world semantics of modal logic. 
Each Aux  Si*  evi* is similar to a possible world, and the single interpretation 
Aux  S*  ev* is similar to a complete frame of possible worlds and accessibility 
relations. In the possible world semantics, fluents belong to possible worlds, and 
events belong to accessibility relations. But in KELPS, all fluents and events are 
timestamped and contained in the single interpretation M = Aux   S*   ev*.  
 
3.3. Sequencing 
 
The temporal constraints of a complex impose a partial order on the timestamps of 
the FOL conditions in the complex. Although these timestamps are partially ordered, 
the complex is used to recognize or generate linearly ordered sequences of states 
satisfying the FOL conditions of the complex. 
 It is useful to have a notation in the meta-language that distinguishes between the 
different sequences represented by the same complex. This notation is not part of the 
KELPS object language, but is useful for defining reactive interpretations and the 
operational semantics of KELPS. Intuitively, a sequencing of the form earlier < 
later means that the FOL conditions in earlier can be evaluated (recognised or gen-
erated) before the FOL conditions in later. 
 
Definition. Let earlier and earlier  later be complexes.4 Then earlier  later has a 
sequencing of the form earlier < later (or of the form earlier   later) if and only if 
there exists a substitution  for all the time variables in earlier  later such that: 
 all the temporal constraints in earlier   later  are true in Aux 
 all the timestamps in FOL conditions in earlier  are earlier than (or earlier than 
 or equal to) all the timestamps in FOL conditions in later . 
 
Notice that both p(T) < true and true < p(T) are allowed sequencings of p(T). For 
example, the complex p(T1) q(T2) has the strict sequencings: p(T1) < q(T2),  q(T2) 
< p(T1), true < p(T1)  q(T2) and p(T1)  q(T2) < true. 
 In some of our earlier papers, we allowed actions selected for execution to con-
tain non-timestamp variables. These variables are instantiated, when they are suc-
cessfully executed, as feedback from the environment. In this paper, we restrict the 
selection of actions to ones that have no such variables. For this purpose, we require 
KELPS frameworks to be range-restricted: 
  
Definition. A KELPS framework <R, Aux, C> is range restricted if and only if, for 
every bare action atom act containing non-timestamp variables in a rule in R of the 
form antecedent  [other  [earlier   act    rest]], there is a sequencing antece-
dent  earlier < act    rest such that all the non-timestamp variables in act occur in 
antecedent or earlier.
 
 
 
3.4. Reactive interpretations 
 
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 exemplify different kinds of models of a KELPS program. The 
following definition characterizes reactive interpretations and models. Loosely 
speaking, an action occurs in a reactive interpretation if and only if it occurs as a 
bare action atom in one of the alternative consequents of an instance of a reactive 
rule, and all earlier FOL conditions in the antecedent and the alternative consequent 
of the instance of the rule are already true in the interpretation before the time of the 
action.  
 
Definition. Given a range restricted KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state S0 
and set ev* of timestamped events, let Cpre be true in I = Aux  S*  ev*, and let 
ev* = ext*  acts* be a partitioning of ev* into external events ext* and actions 
acts*. Then I is reactive if and only if, for every action action  I, there exists a rule 
r  R of the form antecedent  [other  [earlier  act  rest]], and there exists a 
substitution   such that r  supports action, in the sense that: 
a)     action is act  
b)     antecedent     earlier   < act   rest  
c)     antecedent     earlier    act   is true in I. 
I is a reactive model of <R, Aux, C> if and only if I is a reactive interpretation and 
R is true in I. 
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 It is not sufficient to require later to be a complex because we want to allow later to have 
temporal constraints with time variables occurring in earlier.    
Note that condition (b) allows rest  to be false in I.    
 
4. The KELPS Operational Semantics 
 
The operational semantics exploits the internal structure of KELPS interpretations 
Aux  S*  ev* to generate them by progressively extending a partial interpretation 
Aux  S0*  ... Si*  ev0*  ... evi* one step at a time. Moreover, it does so by 
maintaining only the unstamped current state Si and the events evi that gave rise to 
Si, without remembering earlier states and events.  
 To recognise complex sequences of states and events in the antecedents of rules 
without remembering past states and events, the OS maintains a current set of par-
tially evaluated rules Ri, which need to be monitored in the future. For example, 
suppose that Ri that contains the rule: 
 
    cry-wolf(T)  ¬help-arrives(T+1)  cry-wolf(T+2) 
 
and that evi* contains the event occurrence cry-wolf(i). Then the OS evaluates the 
condition cry-wolf(T) in the augmented current state and adds to Ri the new rule: 
 
   ¬help-arrives(i+1)  cry-wolf(i+2) 
 
The OS also maintains a goal state Gi containing partially evaluated alternative plans 
to be made true in the future. For example, if evi+1* does not contain the event oc-
currence help-arrives(i+1), then the OS evaluates ¬help-arrives(i+1) in the aug-
mented current state to true, and adds to Gi+1 the new, top-level goal cry-wolf(i+2). 
 Logically, a goal state Gi is a conjunction Gi1   ...   Gin, where each Gij is a dis-
junction of partially evaluated alternative plans for making true the consequent of an 
instance of a rule whose antecedent has already become true. To be more precise, 
each disjunct in Gij is the instantiated remainder later   of a rule antecedent   
[other   [earlier    later]] in R whose earlier part antecedent   earlier   is al-
ready true in the partial interpretation Aux  S0*  ...  Si*   ev0*  ...  evi* gener-
ated so far. Because of their similarity to goal clauses in logic programming, such 
disjuncts later    are also called goal clauses in KELPS.  
Operationally, the goal state Gi is a set (conjunction) of independent threads Gij, 
and each thread is a goal tree. The root node is the instantiated consequent of a rule 
whose antecedent has already become true. The non-root nodes are goal clauses. The 
goal tree representation helps to structure the search space of alternative plans, and 
to guide the search for alternatives. If the goal trees are searched in a depth-first 
fashion, then they can be implemented by stacks, as in Prolog. Backtracking is pos-
sible, but previously generated actions and states cannot be undone. 
The following abstract specification of the OS ignores many optimizations that 
can improve efficiency. These are described in (Kowalski and Sadri 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2014). Some of these optimizations restrict the models that can be generated, 
and hence affect the relationship between the interpretations generated by the OS 
and the interpretations sanctioned by the definition of reactive interpretation.  
In the following definition, the OS is presented as an agent cycle. At the end of 
each cycle, external events are input and combined with selected actions. The result-
ing combined set of events is used to update the current state. In other versions of 
the OS, these updates were performed at the beginning of the cycle.  
 
Definition. The OS Cycle. Given a range restricted KELPS framework <R, Aux, 
C> and an initial state S0, let ev0 = {}. Let G0 be the goal state obtained by creating, 
for every rule r in R of the form true  consequent, a goal tree with consequent at 
the root, and adding each disjunct of consequent whose constraints are satisfiable in 
Aux as a child of the root. Let R0 be R without these rules. 
 For i ≥ 0, given Si, Ri, Gi  and evi, the i-th cycle consists of the following steps:  
 
Step 1. Evaluate antecedents. (a) For every sequencing current   <  later   of the 
antecedent of an instance r  of a rule r of the form current  later consequent in 
Ri, where current  is a non-empty complex, add later    consequent   as a new 
reactive rule to Ri, if:  
1. current   is true in Aux  Si*  evi*,  
2.   instantiates all and only the variables in current, 
3.  instantiates all the variable timestamps in FOL conditions in current to i, 
4. current contains all the temporal constraints in the antecedent of  r  that    
 become true in Aux as the result of evaluating the FOL conditions in current. 
(b) If later  is empty (equivalent to true) then delete later    consequent   from 
Ri and start a new thread in Gi with  consequent  at the root. Add each disjunct of 
consequent  whose constraints are satisfiable in Aux as a child of the root. 
 
Step 2. Evaluate goal clauses. Choose a set of sequencings current   < later  of  
instances C  of goal clauses C, where current  is a non-empty complex, from one or 
more threads in Gi. For each such choice, add later   to Gi as a child of C, if: 
  current  is true in Aux  Si*  evi*,
2.   instantiates all and only the variables in current, 
3.  instantiates all the variable timestamps in FOL conditions in current to i, 
4.  current  contains all the temporal constraints in C that become true in Aux as  
  the result of evaluating the FOL conditions in current. 
 
 Step 3. Choose candidate actions. Choose a set of sequencings actions τ   rest τ  
of instances C τ of goal clauses C from one or more threads in Gi, where τ instanti-
ates all and only the timestamp variables in actions to i+1, and actions τ is the con-
junction of all the ground bare action atoms in C τ that have the timestamp i+1. Let 
candidate-actsi+1 be the set of all the action atoms in all such actions τ.  
 
Step 4. Update Si, Gi, Ri. Choose
5
 a subset actsi+1*  candidate-actsi+1 such that 
Cpre  is true in Aux  Si*  evi*  evi+1*, where evi+1* =  exti+1*  actsi+1* and the 
external events exti+1* are given. Let Si+1 = succ(Si, evi+1), Gi+1 = Gi  and Ri+1 = Ri.  
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 Note that if an action act in a goal clause C is selected in step 3 and is successfully executed 
in step 4, then C is a candidate to be selected in step 2 of the next cycle, and act is a candi-
date to be selected for evaluation to true in C. Moreover, other occurrences of act in other 
goal clauses can be evaluated to true in the same cycle, even if they were not selected in 
step 3 of the previous cycle. 
Note that the OS can attempt to make an instance of a consequent of a reactive rule 
true even though the same instance of the consequent has already been made true. 
This can be avoided easily in the OS, by adding an extra case (b) to step 2, analo-
gous to case (b) of step 1, but would make the corresponding definition of reactive 
interpretations more complex. However, there are other optimisations that can be 
made to the OS, without affecting the definition of reactive interpretation. These 
optimisations include removing from Ri rules whose antecedents are timed out, and 
removing from Gi goal clauses containing a fluent or event atom that is timed out.  
 
5 Relationships between the Model-theoretic and the Operational Semantics 
 
The proof of soundness for the OS of LPS (Kowalski and Sadri 2010, 2011, 2014), 
also applies to KELPS, and details of the proof are given in the appendix: 
 
Theorem 2. Soundness. Given a KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state S0 
and sequence  ext1,…, exti,… of sets of external events, suppose that the OS gener-
ates the sequences of sets acts1,…, actsi,… of actions and S1,…, Si,… of states. Then 
R  Cpre is true in I = Aux   S*   ev* if, for every goal tree that is added to a goal 
state Gi, i ≥ 0, the goal clause true is added to the same goal tree in some goal state 
Gj,  j ≥ i. 
 
The following theorem characterises the interpretations generated by the OS. It is a 
correctness result for reactive interpretations. The detailed proof is in the appendix. 
 
Theorem 3. Every interpretation generated by the OS is reactive. Given a range 
restricted  KELPS framework  <R, Aux, C>, initial state S0 and set of external events 
ext*, let acts* be the set of actions generated by the OS, and ev* = ext*  acts*. 
Then I = Aux   S*   ev* is a reactive interpretation. 
 
Proof Sketch: Here is a sketch of the proof for the case where all variables in X and 
Y in rules X [antecedent Y [consequent]] have been replaced by all their ground 
instances, and all the resulting ground temporal constraints have been evaluated, so 
that the resulting rules no longer contain any temporal constraints: 
 To show that any action generated by the OS is supported, we show more gener-
ally that, if a goal clause C is in a goal state Gi, where i ≥ 0, then there exists a rule 
in R of the form antecedent  [other  [earlier  C]] such that earlier < C and 
antecedent and earlier are true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi*. 
 If an action act is generated by the OS, then it belongs to some actsi+1, i ≥ 0, and 
act is selected as a candidate in step 3 at time i from a goal clause in Gi that has a 
sequencing act ≤ rest. It follows that r supports act, and I is supported. 
 
The following theorem is a kind of completeness result for reactive interpretations. 
The detailed proof is in the appendix. 
 
Theorem 4. Every reactive interpretation can be generated by the OS. Given a 
range restricted KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state S0 and external events 
ext*, let acts* be a set of actions such that I = Aux   S*   ev*, where ev* = ext* 
 acts*, is a reactive interpretation. Then there exist choices in steps 2, 3 and 4 such 
that the OS generates acts* (and therefore generates I). 
 
Proof Sketch: Here is a sketch for the case where all the variables X and Y in rules 
X [antecedent Y [consequent]] are replaced by their ground instances, and all 
temporal constraints have been evaluated: 
 Let acti  acts* be an action at time i supported by a rule r  R. Then r has the 
form antecedent  [other  [early  acti  rest]], where antecedent   early  is true 
in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1*. It suffices to show that Gi  contains  a 
goal clause of the form acti  rest, because then the OS can choose candidate actions 
in step 3 and a combination evi* =  exti*  actsi*,  of external events and candidate 
actions in step 4, such that actsi* is the set of all such actions acti. 
 To show that Gi  contains  a goal clause of the form acti  rest, we show more 
generally that for all times k   i, and for all r  R that support an action in actsi*  
there exist choices in steps 2, 3 and 4 such that either: 
 r has the form antecedent [other  [early  late]] where late  is in Gk  and  
 antecedent  early is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Sk-1*  ev0* … evk-1* or 
 r has the form earlier later  consequent, where later  consequent is in Rk 
 and earlier is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Sk-1*  ev0* …  evk-1*. 
 
Frame axioms. Most logic-based causal theories in AI employ frame axioms to 
represent and reason about change of state. These frame axioms represent the prop-
erty that a fluent persists from one state to the next, unless it is terminated by the 
events that give rise to the state transition. They are used either to reason forwards to 
copy fluents unchanged from one state to the next, or to reason backwards to deter-
mine whether a fluent holds in a state by determining whether holds in the previous 
state. The use of destructive assignment in LPS and KELPS avoids these computa-
tionally expensive forms of reasoning. 
 In (Kowalski and Sadri 2015), we show that frame axioms are an emergent prop-
erty of the LPS operational semantics. This is analogous to showing, for example, 
that associativity of addition is an emergent property of a program that computes 
addition. The proof for LPS also applies to KELPS. In fact, the proof does not de-
pend on the OS, but only on the definition of succ(Si, evi+1): 
 
Theorem 5. Frame axioms are an emergent property. Given definitions Cpost of 
the predicates initiates and terminates, initial state S0 and sequence of sets of concur-
rent events ev1, …, evi, ..., let I = Cpost   S*   ev*, where: 
  S*  =  S0*     …    Si*      … where Si+1 = succ(Si, evi+1) and 
  ev*  =  ev1*    …   evi*    ….  
Then for all evi +1, i ≥ 0 and fluents p, the following sentence is true in I: 
[initiates(evi+1, p)  p(i+1)]  
 [p(i)  ¬ terminates(evi+1, p)  p(i+1)] 
 
6  Related Work 
 
The development of KELPS/LPS has been influenced by work in many different 
areas of computing, including programming, databases and artificial intelligence. To 
make the task of comparison with related work more manageable, we focus primari-
ly on comparing KELPS/LPS with other approaches that attempt to give a logical 
semantics to rule-based systems. Our earlier papers (Kowalski and Sadri 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2014, 2015) include extensive comparisons between LPS and many of 
these systems. In this paper, we relate the earlier comparisons with KELPS, and 
include other related work. 
 
6.1 LPS 
 
First, we need to clarify the relationship between KELPS and LPS. Consider, for 
example, a reactive rule in LPS, which expresses a robot’s goal of replying with a 
sentence to any sentence said by an agent called “turing”: 
 
 sentence(turing, T1, T2) sentence(robot, T3, T4)  T2 < T3 < T2 + 3 sec   
 
Here the predicate sentence represents a composite event or action with its start and 
end times. In LPS, the predicate can be defined by a logic program, which can be 
used both to recognize and to generate sentences. The logic program could include, 
among other clauses defining the predicates np and vp, such clauses as:  
 
  sentence(Agent, T1, T3)  np(Agent, T1, T2)  vp(Agent, T2, T3) 
  adj(Agent, T, T+1)  say(Agent, human, T, T+1) 
  noun(Agent, T, T+1)  say(Agent, human, T, T+1)     
 
Here say represents a primitive event with its start and end times, In KELPS, such a 
primitive event is represented more simply with only its end time. 
 In KELPS, it is possible to get a similar effect to LPS, by replacing the one rule 
by infinitely many rules, including for example the rule: 
 
  say(turing, i, 2)  say(turing, am, 3)  say(turing, human, 4)  
  say(robot, you, 6)  say(robot, are, 7)  say(robot, intelligent, 8) 
 
This is neither practical nor desirable, which is why LPS has both reactive rules and 
logic programs. As far as we know, other than CHR (section 6.4), there is no other 
language not derived from ALP that combines reactive rules and logic programs, but 
retains their separate character. Most languages that have only reactive rules simu-
late logic programs by treating goals as facts. Most approaches that give a logical 
semantics to reactive rules translate them into logic programs.  
 In this paper, we have restricted our attention to reactive rules in KELPS only 
because it simplifies and clarifies the investigation of completeness.  
 
6.2 Abductive Logic Programming (ALP) and the Event Calculus 
  
LPS (and therefore KELPS) originated in our earlier work on ALP (Fung and Kow-
alski 1997; Kakas et al 1998) and ALP agents (Kowalski and Sadri 1999, 2009; 
Kowalski 2011). ALP extends logic programming by allowing certain predicates 
(called abducible or open predicates) to be assumed in order to solve a problem. 
These assumptions are restricted by means of integrity constraints. In ALP agents, 
the abducible predicates represent actions, and the integrity constraints include reac-
tive rules. The main difference is that KELPS/LPS uses destructive updates for state 
transitions, whereas ALP agents use the event calculus (Kowalski and Sergot 1986). 
Although the event calculus has been viewed as solving the frame problem 
(Shanahan 1997), we believe that it cannot compete for practical applications with 
destructive change of state. However, destructive change of state does not have an 
obvious logical semantics. In particular, if states are axiomatic theories, which are 
syntactic objects, then destructive change of state is problematic, because it is not 
possible to change the axioms during the course of trying to prove a theorem.  
KELPS/LPS retains the ontology of the event calculus but replaces explicit rea-
soning with event calculus axioms by implicit construction of timestamped 
Herbrand interpretations. As a consequence, KELPS/LPS can generate only reactive 
models. In contrast, the use of the event calculus in ALP agents can also generate 
preventative and proactive models.  
LPS inherits from ALP the property that models can contain irrelevant actions. In 
ALP, irrelevant actions can be avoided by minimizing the set of actions contained in 
a model. In LPS, the generation of irrelevant actions is reduced by generating only 
reactive interpretations, which contain only actions that are instances of action atoms 
that occur explicitly in the consequents of reactive rules.   
 
6.3  MetateM 
 
To the best of our knowledge, MetateM (Barringer et al 1996) is the only other 
framework not based on ALP that describes state transitions by reactive rules in 
logical form and that treats computation as model generation. Programs in MetateM 
consist of sentences in modal temporal logic of the form: 
 
‘past and present formula’ implies ‘present or future formula’ 
 
Computation consists in generating a model in which all such sentences are true. 
MetateM does not formally distinguish between events and fluents, and does not 
have an explicit causal theory, but frame axioms and other logic programs are writ-
ten, as needed, in the form of reactive rules. 
 Like KELPS, MetateM lacks the logic programs of LPS. The main differences are 
that, in KELPS, time is represented explicitly, models are classical rather than mod-
al, and models are constructed by means of destructive updates. In LPS, there is the 
further difference that logic programs are separate from and additional to reactive 
rules. 
 (Barringer et al 1996) presents an operational semantics for propositional 
MetateM without external events.  Despite the claim (on page 148) that the MetateM 
OS is complete, our examples of non-reactive models for KELPS can be translated 
into MetateM, and show that the MetateM OS can generate only reactive models, 
and therefore is incomplete.   
 
6.4 Constraint Handling Rules (CHR) 
 
Closer to LPS in syntactic structure and expressive power is the language CHR 
(constraint handling rules) (Frühwirth 1998, 2009). As in LPS, there are two kinds 
of rules: equivalences and propagation rules. Equivalences can be used like ordinary 
logic programs, but can also be used for simplification. Propagation rules are logical 
implications, which are used to reason forward, like reactive rules in KELPS. CHR

 
(Abdennadher and Schütz 1998) extends CHR to include disjunctions in the conse-
quents of propagation rules, more like reactive rules in KELPS.  
 The operational semantics of propagation rules in CHR

 is similar to that of 
KELPS, and the operational semantics of propagation rules and equivalences is 
similar to that of LPS. CHR has a classical logic semantics, in which computation is 
interpreted as theorem-proving, similar to that of the IFF proof-procedure (Fung and 
Kowalski 1997). This semantics does not justify destructive updates. But CHR also 
has a translation into linear logic (Betz and Frühwirth, 2005), which justifies de-
structive updates in the style of LPS, but without the use of timestamps. 
 The linear logic semantics of CHR is very different from the model-theoretic 
semantics of KELPS/LPS, in which time is represented explicitly, and state transi-
tions are performed by means of a causal theory. Although propagation rules are 
similar to reactive rules, it is not clear how the completeness and incompleteness of 
the KELPS/LPS OS relate to the completeness results for CHR/ CHR

.   
 
6.5 Production systems (PS) 
 
Production systems are computer languages in which programs are sets of sentences 
of the form if conditions then actions. State transitions are performed by evaluating 
the conditions in the current state and executing the corresponding actions, perform-
ing “conflict resolution” to choose between conflicting actions. The chosen actions 
destructively update the current state. 
 It was the attempt to understand the logic of production systems and their rela-
tionship with logic programs that led to the development of LPS (which explains the 
PS in LPS). Several other authors have also attempted to provide production rules 
with a logical semantics, mostly by mapping them into logic programs. Raschid
 
(1994), in particular, transforms production rules into logic programs, and uses the 
fixed point semantics of logic programming to perform forward chaining. Baral and 
Lobo
 
(1995), on the other hand, translate production rules into the situation calculus 
represented as a logic program with the stable model semantics.  
 More recently, Damásio et al 2010) use incremental Answer Set Programming 
(ASP) to realize different conflict resolution strategies for the RIF-PRD production 
system dialect. Eiter et al. (2012) simulate production systems in ASP with an inter-
face to an external environment, performing state changes by updating and accessing 
the environment via action atoms and external atoms. Gebser et al. (2011) use dis-
junctive logic programs (but without existential quantifiers) to represent reactive 
rules in ASP, for “reasoning about real-time dynamic systems running online in 
changing environments”.  
To the best of our knowledge, none of these mappings into logic programs per-
form destructive updates in the manner of production systems and KELPS/LPS. 
In contrast with these approaches, KELPS/LPS reformulates production rules as 
reactive rules, and not as logic programs. In LPS, logic programs are like “deduc-
tive” databases, and reactive rules are like database integrity constraints. 
  
 
 
6.6 Integrity Constraints 
 
The model-theoretic semantics of KELPS, which is fundamental to the investigation 
of completeness in this paper, is based upon the model-theoretic semantics of integ-
rity constraints in deductive databases and ALP. However, from a historical perspec-
tive (Kowalski 2014), the model-theoretic semantics is only one of two main alter-
natives. The other alternative is the theorem-hood view, in which integrity con-
straints (and queries) are meant to be theorems that are a logical consequence of the 
database regarded as a theory. 
 In the parallel world of logic programming, there has been a shift away from the 
theorem-proving view of computation to a model-generation view.  Our own work 
on the semantics of KELPS/LPS has followed this shift from theorem-proving to 
model-generation. In LPS, the semantics of logic programs (Kowalski and Sadri 
2015) is in the spirit of the well-founded semantics (Van Gelder et al, 1991). But in 
the case of KELPS, the role of logic programs is played more simply by sets of 
ground atoms, which are equivalent to relational databases.  
  Reactive rules in KLEPS/LPS are similar in syntax to integrity constraints in the 
form of disjunctive tuple-generating dependencies in relational databases (Wang et 
al. 2001). But, whereas in relational databases the main focus has been on the prob-
lem of deciding whether a given set of tuple-generating dependencies logically im-
plies another dependency, in KELPS/LPS the focus is on generating a model that 
makes integrity constraints in the form of reactive rules R and preconditions Cpre 
true.  
 In recent years, most of the activity in deductive databases has become associated 
with Datalog, in which databases are logic programs without function symbols. 
Datalog±
 
(Calì et al. 2009) extends Datalog with existential rules, which are similar 
in syntax to reactive rules in KELPS/LPS (but without disjunctive consequents), and 
which can similarly be viewed as integrity constraints. However, whereas reactive 
rules and logic programs are separate components of LPS, in Datalog± logic pro-
grams are a special case of existential rules. So in effect, Datalog±  does not distin-
guish between the database and integrity constraints. Moreover, it deals only with 
one database state at a time, and does not deal with database updates. 
Datalog± generates answers to queries by using a bottom-up procedure, called the 
chase (Maier et al, 1979), which is also used in (Wang et al. 2001).  Gavanelli et al 
(2015) map Datalog± into ALP, and show how the SCIFF proof procedure Alberti et 
al. 2008), which extends the IFF proof procedure of (Fung and Kowalski, 1997) 
generates the same answers as the chase procedure. The IFF proof procedure, in 
turn, is one of the progenitors of the KELPS/LPS OS.  
The IFF proof procedure, in turn, is similar to the SATCHMO proof procedure 
(Manthey and Bry, 1988) for the full clausal form of first-order logic. SATCHMO is 
a bottom-up procedure, which can be viewed both as a resolution-based theorem-
prover and as a model-generator. 
 
6.7  Transaction Logic 
 
Transaction Logic (TR) (Bonner and Kifer 1993) is a logic-based formalism for 
defining transactions, which are similar to complex plans in KELPS/LPS, and which 
similarly update states of a logic program or database. Transactions in TR have a 
logical, model-theoretic semantics, which, like the possible world semantics of 
modal logic, is based on sets of possible worlds (or states). But unlike modal logic, 
the truth value of a transaction is defined along a path of states, starting with the 
state at the beginning of the transaction and ending with the state at the end of the 
transaction. As in KELPS/LPS, state transitions are performed by means of destruc-
tive updates. Although there is no direct analogue of the reactive rules of 
KELPS/LPS, they can be simulated by transactions. Rezk and Kifer (2012) use such 
a simulation to give a logic-based semantics to a production system language. 
KELPS shares with TR the view of computation as making a goal true by generat-
ing a sequence of destructively updated states. Moreover, the inclusion of FOL con-
ditions in KELPS/LPS was largely inspired by similar FOL conditions in TR trans-
actions. The main differences are that, in KELPS, transactions are the consequents 
of reactive rules that are triggered when the antecedents become true, time is repre-
sented explicitly, and all states, actions and events are combined into a single model-
theoretic structure. 
TR
ev
 (Gomes and Alferes 2014) extends TR by combining the generation of com-
plex transactions with the recognition of complex events. As a consequence, its ex-
pressive power is similar to KELPS, but it represents complex events and complex 
transactions separately, without combining them into reactive rules that are logical 
implications.  
 
6.8 Active Databases 
 
A number of researchers have attempted to develop logic-based semantics for active 
databases. The majority of these approaches map reactive rules in the form of event-
condition-action (ECA) rules into logic programs. For example, both Zaniolo
 
(1993) 
and Lausen et al. (1998) use frame axioms similar to those in Theorem 5, and reduce 
ECA rules to logic programs such as action(T+1)  condition(T)  event(T+1). 
Fernandes et al. (1997) give separate logical formalisations of events, conditions and 
actions, but without combining them into reactive rules that are logical implications.  
Like production systems, and unlike KELPS/LPS, active databases are restricted 
to rules whose antecedents query the current state, and whose consequents update 
the current state.   
 
6.9  Agent Languages 
 
Bailey et al. (1995) argue that, although they differ in their intended applications 
and research communities, many agent languages developed in AI are similar to 
active database systems. In particular, agent plans in BDI agents are similar to ECA 
rules in active databases. Moreover, both BDI agents and active databases maintain 
a destructively updated database state, and lack a declarative semantics. 
 LPS is a direct descendant of ALP agents, which embed ALP in the thinking 
component of a BDI-like agent cycle. In ALP agents, a logic program represents the 
agent’s beliefs, and initial goals and integrity constraints represent the agent’s goals 
(or desires). The database is updated by using the event calculus, using frame axi-
oms. The ALP agent approach was developed further in the KGP agent model
 
(Mancarella et al. 2009). In contrast, the operational semantics of LPS employs a 
destructively updated database, which represents the current state. 
 The destructive updates of LPS were inspired in part by their use in BDI-agent 
languages such as AgentSpeak
 
(Rao 1996). Programs in AgentSpeak are collections 
of statements of the form:  
 
     event E: conditions C  goals G and actions A.  
  
The event E can be the addition or deletion of a belief literal or a goal atom, stored 
in a database. The conditions C query the database, and the goals G and actions A 
update the database by adding or deleting goals and beliefs. As a result, plans com-
bine some of the functionality of both reactive rules and logic programs in LPS. 
However, they do not allow complex events in the event or conditions part of plans, 
and they do not include temporal constraints. Moreover, they do not a have a logical 
semantics. In fact, when E is the addition of a belief literal, the arrow   is opposite 
to the arrow of logical implication in KELPS/LPS. 
 A number of authors have also developed agent languages and systems in a logic 
programming context. For example in DALI
 
(Costantini and Tocchio 2014) and 
EVOLP (Brogi 2002) events transform an initial agent logic program into a se-
quence of logic programs. ERA (Alferes et al. 2006) extends EVOLP with complex 
events, complex actions, and event-condition-action rules. The semantics of the 
evolutionary sequence of logic programs in DALI, EVOLP and ERA is given by an 
associated sequence of models. In ERA, ECA rules are translated into logic pro-
grams of the form action condition  event. In contrast, KELPS/LPS distinguishes 
between the semantics of logic programs and reactive rules, and combines the se-
quence of states and events into a single model using timestamps. 
 FLUX
 
(Thielscher 2005) is a constraint logic programming language for imple-
menting intelligent agents using the fluent calculus. One of the objectives of the 
fluent calculus is to avoid the computational inefficiency of reasoning with frame 
axioms, by reifying states as lists of fluents. However, the list representation re-
quires the explicit use of recursion both to query whether a fluent is a member of a 
list representing a state, and to delete a fluent if it is terminated by an action. Argua-
bly, this is nearly as inefficient as reasoning with explicit frame axioms. In contrast, 
in KELPS/LPS, states are not represented explicitly in the language, but are repre-
sented implicitly by sets of fluents, and membership and deletion are performed by 
associative look-up. In FLUX, states can be updated by sensing actions, but there 
seems to be no analogue of the reactive rules of KELPS/LPS.  
 In (Governatori and Rotolo, 2013), the authors present an efficient algorithm for 
computing argumentation-style extensions in temporal defeasible logic (TDL). Pro-
grams in TDL are logical implications with time stamps, similar to reactive rules in 
KELPS. The time complexity of the algorithm is proportional to the size of the rules, 
which is much more efficient than explicit reasoning with event calculus style frame 
axioms. However, because the algorithm is not described in terms of destructive 
updates, it is difficult to compare it directly with the OS of KELPS. 
 Most of these approaches focus on the internal reasoning of individual agents, 
treating other agents as part of the external environment. In contrast, SCIFF (Alberti 
et al. 2008) focuses directly on the specification and verification of multi-agent sys-
tems, abstracting away from the internal structure of individual agents. It uses ALP 
to represent the expected behavior of agents and a variant of the IFF proof procedure 
(Fung and Kowalski 1997), to verify that actual behaviour conforms to expectations. 
Integrity constraints in SCIFF resemble ECA rules, but are used to specify the oc-
currence of events, and not to generate them. Events are timestamped, but are not 
related to fluents by a causal theory. 
 
6.10 Reactive Systems Programming Languages  
    
Although LPS has its origins in logic programming, which is Turing complete, the 
kernel of LPS is its reactive rules. This shift from logic programs to reactive rules 
reflects our better appreciation of the fundamental role of state transition systems in 
all areas of computing, including reactive systems programming languages. 
As David Harel (1987) puts it: “Much of the literature also seems to be in agree-
ment that states and events are a piori a rather natural medium for describing the 
dynamic behaviour of a complex system.... A basic fragment of such a description is 
a state transition, which takes the general form when event Y occurs in state A, if 
condition C is true at the time, the system transfers to state B”. Harel contrasts such 
reactive systems with “transformational systems”, which transform inputs into out-
puts in a purely declarative manner. Arguably, LPS reconciles Harel’s two kinds of 
computational systems, with reactive rules providing the reactive part, and logic 
programs providing structure for the “transformational” part. 
In contrast, Shapiro (1989) argues that concurrent logic programming languages 
are well suited for specifying reactive systems. In these languages, the state of a 
computation consists of a goal, which is a sequence of atoms and an assignment of 
values to variables in the goals. Programs are guarded Horn clauses, which have the 
form head   guard  body. Goal atoms that match the head and satisfy the guard 
are reduced to the goal atoms in the body. 
Each goal atom is viewed as a process, and the goal as a whole is viewed as a 
network of concurrent processes. Processes communicate by instantiating shared 
logical variables. The external environment is represented by a process whose be-
haviour is specified by another concurrent logic program.  
This approach to reactive systems is very different from that of KELPS/LPS, in 
which states are sets of time-stamped atoms. Operationally, KELPS/LPS is closer to 
coordination languages, such as Linda (Carriero and Gelernter, 1989), in which 
processes interact through the medium of a shared state. 
Whereas Harel sees the need for both transformational and reactive systems, and 
Shapiro reduces both kinds of systems to logic programs, Gurevich (2000) models 
all varieties of computation by abstract state machines (ASM), programmed by rules 
of the form if guard then assignments. States are abstract, model-theoretic structures 
consisting of objects and functions. State transitions are performed by evaluating the 
all the guards of rules if guard then assignments that are true in the current state and 
executing all of the corresponding assignments destructively and in parallel. 
 Rules in ASM are similar to condition-action rules in production systems and to 
reactive rules in KELPS. However, ASM rules are more restricted than KELP/LPS 
rules, whose antecedents and consequents can involve an entire complex of tempo-
rally constrained FOL conditions. Compared with LPS, in which all states are com-
bined in a single model, only the individual states in ASM are model-theoretic in 
character. Moreover, the if-then syntax of guarded assignments in ASM does not 
mean logical implication.  
 7  Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This paper makes a contribution to analyzing the relationship between the opera-
tional and model-theoretic semantics of KELPS. In the future, it would be useful to 
extend the results to LPS. It would also be interesting to extend the OS to capture 
more of the non-reactive interpretations that satisfy the model-theoretic semantics.   
 On the practical side, it would be useful to extend reactive rules to allow more 
complex event conditions. This extension would not affect the model-theoretic se-
mantics, and can be implemented, for example, by storing a window of past events. 
It is also important to explore the treatment of concurrency in greater depth, espe-
cially in the context of multi-agent systems, in which the external events of a single 
agent include actions generated by other agents. 
 There are a number of implementations of LPS. Making some of these available 
for wider use is a major priority for future work. 
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Appendix 
 
Theorem 2. Given a KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state S0 and sequence  
ext1,…, exti,… of sets of external events, suppose that the OS generates the sequenc-
es of sets acts1,…, actsi,… of actions and S1,…, Si,… of states. Then R  Cpre is true 
in I = Aux   S*   ev* if, for every goal tree that is added to a goal state Gi, i ≥ 0, 
the goal clause true is added to the same goal tree in some goal state Gj, j  ≥ i. 
 
Proof. To show Cpre  is true in  Aux  S*  ev*, it suffices to show Cpre is true in 
each  Aux  Si*  evi*  evi+1*. But this is ensured by step 4 of the OS. 
 To show R is true in Aux  S*  ev*, we need to show that for every rule of the 
form X [antecedent  Y consequent] in R, whenever some instance antecedent  
of the antecedent is true in I then the corresponding instance consequent   of the 
consequent is also true in I. But if antecedent  is true in I, then antecedent  be-
comes true at some time i in Aux  S0*  ...  Si*   ev0*  ...  evi*, and conse-
quent  is added as the root of a new goal tree to the current goal state Gi. Each dis-
junct consequentj   whose temporal constraints are satisfiable in Aux is added as a 
child of the root node.  
 Clearly, consequentj    implies consequent  . So if true  consequentj    is 
true in I, then consequent    is true in I.  The truth of true  consequentj    in I 
follows from the more general fact that if a goal clause C is added in step 2 as a 
child of a goal clause C’, then C  C’ is true in I.  
 Therefore the existence of a goal state Gj  where i ≤ j and true is added to the 
same goal tree as consequent   in Gj implies that consequent  is true at time j, and 
therefore consequent   is  true in I. 
 
The proof of Theorem 3 uses Lemma 2, which is proved using Lemma 1: 
 
Lemma 1: For i  ≥ 0, let r be a rule in Ri . Then there exists a rule in R of the form 
ear  con  consequent and a substitution  that grounds all and only the variables 
in ear such that:  
  ear  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi* 
  ear    < con  
  con   consequent  is r.   
 
Proof: Let n be the number of applications of step 1 in the derivation of r. The proof 
is by induction on n. 
 
Base case n = 0:  Because r was derived by 0 applications of step 1, it follows that r 
 R. Then r has the form ear  con  consequent, where ear is empty (equivalent 
to true). Let  be the empty substitution. Then: 
  ear  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi* 
  ear    < con        
  con   consequent  is r. This proves the base case. 
 
Inductive step n > 0:   Let r be added to some Rk by an application of step 1 of the 
OS to some rule r’ in Rk, where k   i.  By step 1 of the OS: 
 r’ has the form current   later consequent, where current  < later 
 r has the form later  consequent  
 current  is true in Aux  Sk* evk* 
   instantiates all and only the variables in current, and  
   instantiates all the timestamp variables in FOL conditions in current to k. 
By the inductive hypothesis applied to r’, there exists a rule r* in R of the form  
  earlier  curr  rest   conseq and a substitution   
 that grounds all and only the variables in earlier such that:  
  earlier  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Sk*  ev0* …  evk* 
  earlier    < curr    rest  
  current is curr    and later  is rest . 
Then: 
  earlier       curr     is true in Aux  S0*  ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi*  
  earlier      curr      < rest      
  rest     conseq    is r. This proves the inductive step. 
 
Lemma 2: For i  ≥ 0, let C be a goal clause in Gi . Then there exists a rule r in R of 
the form antecedent  [other  [earlier  conds]] and a substitution  that grounds 
all and only the variables in antecedent  earlier such that:    
 antecedent     earlier  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi* 
 earlier    < conds  and 
 conds   is C. 
 
Proof: Let n be the number of applications of step 2 in the derivation of C. The 
proof is by induction on n, and is similar to that of Lemma 1. 
 
Base case n = 0: If C is in G0, then, by the definition of G0 , there exists a rule r of 
the form true  [other  [earlier  C]] where earlier is empty, and r has the form 
required in the statement of the Lemma. If C is added in step 1 of the OS to Gk, k   
i, then Rk  contains a rule r of the form true [other  C] where other  C is a new 
root node added to Gk. As a consequence of Lemma 1, there exists a rule in R of the 
form ear  con  consequent and a substitution  that grounds all and only the 
variables in ear such that: 
  ear  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Sk*  ev0* …  evk*  
  ear    < con         
  con   consequent  is r. So 
  con   is true, and consequent  is other  C. 
Let consequent have the form [alternatives  [earlier  conds]] where earlier is true 
and conds  is C. Then  grounds all and only the variables in ear  con  earlier 
and: 
  ear   con     earlier  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi* 
  earlier    < conds     
  conds  is C. This proves the base case. 
 
Inductive step n > 0:   Let C be added in step 2 of the OS to Gk as a child of a goal 
clause C’, where C’ is in Gk, k   i. By step 2 of the OS: 
 C’ has the form current    later, where current    < later  ,   
 C has the form later ,  
 current   is true in Aux  Sk*  evk*,   
   instantiates all and only the variables in current, and  
   instantiates all the timestamp variables in FOL conditions in current to k. 
By the inductive hypothesis applied to C’, there exists a rule r in R of the form 
 antecedent   [other  [earlier  curr  rest ]] and a substitution   
 that grounds all and only the variables in antecedent  earlier such that:  
 antecedent     earlier  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Sk*  ev0* …  evk*    
 earlier    < curr    rest  
 current is curr     and later  is rest . 
Then: 
 antecedent      earlier       curr       
 is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi*  
 earlier      curr      < rest      
 rest    is C. This proves the inductive step. 
 
Theorem 3. Given a range restricted KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state 
S0 and set of external events ext*, let acts* be the set of actions generated by the OS, 
and ev* = ext*  acts*. Then I = Aux  S*  ev* is a reactive interpretation. 
 
Proof: Assume that, for i ≥ 0, an action action τ is added to candidate-actsi+1 in step 
3 and included in actsi+1 in step 4 of the OS at time i. It follows that there exists a 
sequencing  action τ  rest τ of an instance of a goal clause action  rest in Gi, 
where τ instantiates only the timestamp variable in action to the time i+1. 
 By Lemma 2 there exists a rule r in R of the form antecedent   [other  [earlier 
 conds1  conds2] and a substitution   that grounds all and only the variables in 
antecedent  earlier such that:   
 antecedent     earlier  is true in Aux  S0*   ...   Si*  ev0* …  evi* 
  conds1    is action  
  conds2    is rest   
  earlier    < action  rest. 
It follows that r  τ supports action τ, in the sense that: 
a)    action τ is conds1  τ 
b)    antecedent  τ  earlier  τ < conds1 τ  conds2 τ 
c) antecedent  τ  earlier  τ  conds1  τ is true in I. 
Moreover, step 4 ensures that Cpre  is true in Aux  Si*  evi+1*. Therefore Cpre is 
true in I. Therefore I is reactive. End of proof. 
 
Theorem 4. Given a range restricted KELPS framework <R, Aux, C>, initial state 
S0 and external events ext*, let acts* be a set of actions such that I = Aux  S*  
ev*, where ev* = ext*  acts*, is a reactive interpretation. Then there exist choices 
in steps 2, 3 and 4 such that the OS generates acts* (and therefore generates I). 
 
Proof. Let R
I
 = {(r,, t) | r  supports an action actt at time t}. We show by induc-
tion on i that for all times i ≥ 0, there exist choices in steps 2, 3 and 4 such that:  
1) For all (r, , t)  RI, if i  t then, at the beginning of the OS cycle at time i,  
either (a) there exists a reactive rule ri  Ri such that: 
  r has the form earlier  later   consequent  
  earlier  is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1*  
  later   consequent  is an instance of  ri  and  
  earlier  < later   
or (b) there exists a goal clause Ci  in Gi such that: 
 r has the form antecedent  [other  [early  late]] 
 antecedent   early  is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1* 
 late  is an instance of Ci  and  
 antecedent   early  < late  
2) At the end of the OS cycle at time i-1, the OS has chosen in step 4 all and only the 
actions in actsi*.  Clearly, (2) implies the statement of the Theorem. 
 Let i = 0 and (r, , t)  RI. If r has the form true [other  [earlier  act  
rest]], where r  supports act , then early  earlier  act  rest, where early is 
empty (i.e. true), is the desired goal clause C0 in G0. Otherwise, r has the form later 
 consequent, where later is not empty, which has the same form as earlier  later 
 consequent, where earlier is empty. This is the desired reactive rule r0  R0. So 
case (1a) holds. (2) also holds, because there are no actions before time 1. 
 Let i > 0 and assume that (1) holds (at the beginning of the cycle at time i-1) and 
that (2) holds (at the end of cycle at time i-2). To show that (1) holds at time i, let (r, 
, t)  RI where i  t. By the induction hypothesis, either (1a) or (1b) holds for (r, , 
t) at time i-1. Suppose first that (1a) holds at time i-1. Then there exists a reactive 
rule ri -1  Ri-1 such that: 
 r has the form earlier  later  consequent  
 earlier  is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-2*  ev0* …  evi-2*   
 later   consequent  is an instance of ri-1 and 
 earlier  < later .  
If no timestamp in later  is equal to i-1, then ri -1 persists until the end of the cycle, 
becomes the desired ri  at the beginning of the next cycle, and (1a) holds for (r, , t) 
at time i. Otherwise, later has the form  current  rest where current  is true in 
Aux  Si-1*  evi-1* and current  < rest .  Then step 1 of the OS must evaluate 
the FOL conditions and temporal constraints in  ri -1 that have current  as an in-
stance, generating a rule ri  Ri-1 such that rest   consequent  is an instance of 
ri. Therefore ri  Ri-1 is such that: 
 r has the form earlier  current  rest  consequent  
 earlier   current  is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1* 
 rest   consequent  is an instance of ri and 
 earlier   current  < rest . 
  
If rest  is not empty, then ri  persists until the end of the cycle, becomes the desired 
ri  at beginning of the next cycle, and (1a) holds for (r, , t) at time i.  
 If rest  is empty, then the OS deletes ri from Ri and adds a new goal tree to Gi-1 
with root node having consequent  as an instance. Because r   supports some 
action actt at time t where i-1  t, then r has the form antecedent  [other  [con-
clusion]] where actt is a bare action conjunction conclusion. Then the OS adds to   
Gi-1  a goal clause C as a child of the new root node such that: 
 r has the form antecedent  [other  [conclusion]] 
 antecedent  is true in Aux  S0*  ...   Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1* 
 conclusion  is an instance of C  and  
 antecedent   conclusion  
 
If no timestamp in FOL conditions in conclusion  is equal to i-1, then rewrite con-
clusion as early  late where early is empty. Then:  
 r has the form antecedent  [other  [early  late]] 
 antecedent   early  is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1* 
 late  is an instance of C  and  
 antecedent   early  < late  
C persists until the end of the cycle, becomes the desired Ci  at the beginning of the 
next cycle, and (1b) holds for (r, , t) at time i. 
 Otherwise, conclusion has the form early  late where early is not empty, early  
is true in Aux  Si-1*  evi-1*, and early  < late . Let the OS in step 2 choose and 
evaluate the FOL conditions and temporal constraints in C that have early  as an 
instance, generating a goal clause Ci  in Gi-1 such that late  is an instance of Ci. 
Then: 
 r has the form antecedent  [other  [early  late]] 
 antecedent   early  is true in Aux  S0*  ...   Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1* 
 late  is an instance of Ci  and  
 antecedent   early  < late  
Ci  persists until the end of the cycle, becomes the desired Ci  at the beginning of the 
next cycle; and (1b) holds for (r, , t) at time i. 
  
Suppose instead that the induction hypothesis holds for (1b). Then there exists a goal 
clause Ci-1  in Gi-1 such that: 
 r has the form antecedent  [other  [early  late]]  
 antecedent   early  is true in Aux  S0*  ...  Si-2*  ev0* …  evi-2* 
 late  is an instance of Ci-1 and  
 antecedent   early  < late . 
 
If no timestamp in FOL conditions in late  is equal to i-1, then Ci-1 persists until the 
end of the cycle, becomes the desired Ci  at the beginning of the next cycle; and (1b) 
holds for (r, , t) at time i.   
 Otherwise late has the form current  rest where current is not empty,  current  
is true in Aux  Si-1*  evi-1*, and current  < rest .  Let the OS in step 2 choose 
and evaluate the FOL conditions and temporal constraints in Ci-1 that have current  
as an instance, generating a goal clause Ci  in Gi-1 such that rest  is an instance of 
Ci. Then: 
 r has the form antecedent  [other  [early  current  rest]] 
 antecedent   early    current   
 is true in Aux  S0*  ...   Si-1*  ev0* …  evi-1* 
 rest  is an instance of Ci  and  
 antecedent   early    current   < rest . 
Ci  persists until the end of the cycle, becomes the desired Ci  at the beginning of the 
next cycle; and (1b) holds for (r, , t) at time i. 
 
To show that (2) holds at time i, we need to ensure that steps 3 and 4 of the OS can 
choose acti if (r, , i)  R
I
. But this follows from (1b), which ensures that if r has the 
form antecedent  [other  [earlier  action  rest]] where action   = acti   and r 
  supports acti, then there exists a goal clause Ci-1 in Gi -1 such that action   rest 
 is an instance of Ci-1. It is easy to see that step 3 can include acti  in candidate-
actsi. Because Cpre is true in I, step 4 of the OS can choose acti among the actions 
generated at the end of the cycle. Moreover, for any other bare action atom act in a 
goal clause in Gi -1 (whether   i  t or i > t for all (r, , t)  R
I
), whether or not step 3 
chooses act, step 4 should not choose act; and this is possible because I satisfies 
Cpre. 
